А refutation of two arguments for the complete subjectivity of human experience
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А refutation of two arguments for the complete subjectivity of human experience
Annotation
PII
S2072-07260000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Pages
97-109
Abstract
The article deals with the question of the subjectivity of human experience, which is of great importance for understanding the relationship between consciousness and reality. The author questions the thesis of the complete subjectivity of experience, according to which we are not given anything but our consciousness in our immediate experience. Since the time of G. Berkeley, this thesis has been used to justify the subjective idealism and has created considerable difficulties for the philosophical realism. However, the the­sis of complete subjectivity of human experience is not self-evident, and many reasons in its favor turn out to be untenable. The traditional arguments for the complete subjectivity of experience include the argument from perceptual relativity and the argument from per­ceptual discontinuity. The article contains the refutation of both of these arguments. The author considers a realistic assumption about the subjective-objective nature of human experience as a possible alternative to the criticized thesis.
Keywords
experience, subjective, objective, reality, external reality, consciousness, real­ism, antirealism, idealism, George Berkeley
Date of publication
01.09.2020
Number of purchasers
22
Views
478
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0.0 (0 votes)
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