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On an argument in defense of emergent substance dualism (an objection to Martine Nida-Rümelin)
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On an argument in defense of emergent substance dualism (an objection to Martine Nida-Rümelin)
Annotation
PII
S2072-07260000616-6-
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Daniel Razeev 
Edition
Volume 13 Issue 3
Pages
150-161
Abstract
The paper deals with Martine Nida-Rümelin’s argument in defense of emergent substance dualism developed in her recent papers. The author reconstructs and critically considers the central claims of the argument: 1. The emergence of new Individuals, 2. The emer­gence of Consciousness Properties, 3. Qualitatively New Properties, 4. Subject Causa­tion, and 5. The causal Powers of Consciousness Properties. The author raises two con­ceptual objections against the argument developed by Nida-Rümelin. The first objection is targets the first premise of the argument and is related to the conceptual ambiguity of the mechanism of formation of body experience, in particular, the argument does not ex­plain whether the organism as a material system is identical to the body. The second ob­jection concerns the fourth and fifth premises of the argument and is related to the princi­ple of the subject causation. The author shows that Nida-Rümelin’s assumption works re­quires a rejection of another important principle, namely the principle of the causal close­ness of the physical. This deprives the argument of one of its most important advantages, namely its compatibility with contemporary naturalism. The author concludes that the ar­gument in defense of emergent substance dualism proposed by Nida-Rümelin cannot be considered as a convincing one without additional improvements of claims 1, 4, and 5.
Keywords
emergentism, dualism, consciousness, causation
Date of publication
01.09.2020
Number of purchasers
22
Views
496
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