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Bringing an end to the interpretative dispute on Descartes’s cogito: the cogito as vérité, cognitio, propositio, and conclusio
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Bringing an end to the interpretative dispute on Descartes’s cogito: the cogito as vérité, cognitio, propositio, and conclusio
Annotation
PII
S2072-07260000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Ayumu Tamura 
Edition
Volume 13 Issue 3
Pages
38-48
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to bring an end to the interpretative dispute on Descartes’s cog­ito: is the cogito known by intuition or by inference? There have been several studies based on both analytical and historical approaches to the dispute, and it seems that we have exhausted all interpretations. Nevertheless, I wish to revisit this dispute, as it ap­pears that the previous studies have overlooked Descartes’s use of words and phrases, which is the most significant for understanding his various discourses on the cogito con­sistently. In this paper, I focus on the terms which Descartes uses to indicate the varied status of the cogito, such as ‘haec cognitio,ego cogito, ergo sum’, ‘hanc propositionem, ego cogito, ergo sum’, ‘hanc conclusionem: cogito, ergo sum’, and so on; Descartes changes carefully the terms in each of the cogito arguments. By focusing on these terms, I try to interpret Descartes’s explanations consistently.
Keywords
René Descartes, cogito, inference, intuition, experience, cognition [cognitio], proposition [propositio], conclusion [conclusio]
Date of publication
01.09.2020
Number of purchasers
22
Views
448
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0.0 (0 votes)
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References



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