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Animals as non-human legal entities
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Animals as non-human legal entities
Annotation
PII
S0236-20070000392-2-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Tomash Petzhikovskiy  Elzanowski Andzhey
Edition
Issue 5
Pages
25-37
Abstract
The current body of knowledge on the subjectivity of some non-human vertebrates makes the juristic dichotomy between commodities and persons untenable. While the great apes may (with some limitations) be treated as persons, most vertebrates are non-personal agents that lack the awareness of their own agency, which does not necessarily diminish the intrinsic value of their lives. Unfortunately, the ongoing efforts to raise the status and thus improve the treatment of all sentient animals are hindered by the lack of a realistic conceptual framework for translating the current knowledge of their subjectivity and ensuing individual interests into politics and legislation. Referring to Western philosophers of law (H. Kelsen, A. Ross, N. MacCormick, L. PetraZycki) we therefore propose to grant vertebrates (and possibly some other animals if their subjectivity is recognized by science) legal rights that are appropriate for non-personal subjects even if the scope of such rights has to be very limited in comparison to the rights of human beings.
Keywords
AGENCY, SUBJECTIVITY, ANIMAL ETHICS, ANIMAL RIGHTS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
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4
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1075
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