Везде
COLLECTIVE ACTION MODEL. PART 1: EQUILIBRIUM, JUSTICE, EFFICIENCY
Table of contents
Annotation Estimate Publication content
References Comments
Share
QR
Metrics
COLLECTIVE ACTION MODEL. PART 1: EQUILIBRIUM, JUSTICE, EFFICIENCY
Annotation
PII
S042473880000525-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Elena Skarzhinskaya  Vladimir Tsurikov
Edition
Volume 53 Issue 2
Pages
118-133
Abstract

The model proposed in the article proposes optimization decisions and describes a hybrid form of agents’ economic organization. For an expected income, a strictly (upward) convex function is considered, dependending upon the amount of investment (effort) put in by each agent. The model demonstrates how independent agents achieve a balanced but not an efficient outcome, free rider problem, as well as the dependence of aggregate income upon the principle of its distribution among agents and upon each agent’s individual characteristics. A multitude of Pareto-effective states is created at the higher levels of investment. The possibility of increasing gain is indivisibly connected with coordinating agents’ actions. We consider various methods of coordinating investments carried out by the agents. It is further shown that in the case where coordination is based on the agents’ mutual trust, a preliminary agreement among agents as to the fair distribution of expected aggregate income (proportionate to the costs incurred) is required in order to achieve a Pareto-effective outcome. Coordination based on the potential of violence, or such that is achieved with the vindictive damages (sanctions), leads to transactional costs associated with information search and the process of penalization. We show that coordination allows increasing the aggregate gain relative to the equilibrium point levels; yet the presence of coordination costs or the absence of trust render the optimum gains unattainable.

Keywords
collective action(s), Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficiency, justice, specific investment, coordination, costs, optimum
Date of publication
01.04.2017
Number of purchasers
4
Views
882
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
Cite   Download pdf

References



Additional sources and materials

Becker G.S. (2003). Human Behavior: Economical Approach. Selected Papers on Economic Theory. Moscow: National Research University Higher School of Economics (in Russian).


Crawford S.E.S., Ostrom E. (1995). A Grammar of Institutions. American Political Science Review 89, 3, 582–600.


Furubotn E.G., Richter R. (2005). Institutions and Economic Theory. The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. Saint Petersburg: Izdatel’skii Dom SPbGU (in Russian).


Grossman S., Hart O. (1986). The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy 94, 4, 691–719.


Hart O.D. (2001). Incomplete Contracts and Theory of the Firm / Williamson O.E. (ed.) (2001). The Nature of the Firm. Moscow: DELO, 206–236 (in Russian).


Hart O.D., Moore J. (1988). Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrics 56, 4, 755–785.


Kapelyushnikov R. (2010). The Multiplicity of Institutional Worlds: The Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences-2009:


Working paper WP3/2010/02 (Part 1). Moscow: National Research University Higher School of Economics (in Russian).


Milgrom P., Roberts J. (2001). Economics, Organization and Management: Vol. 1–2. Saint Petersburg: Ekonomicheskaya shkola (in Russian).


Olson M. (1995). The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Moscow: FEI (in Russian).


Ostrom E. (1998). A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action. American Political Science Review 92, 1, 1–22.


Ostrom E. (2011). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Moscow: IRISEN. (in Russian).


Shastitko A. (2001). Incomplete Contracts: Problems of Definition and Modeling. Voprosy Economiki 6, 80–99 (in Russian).


Shastitko A. (2007). The Economic theory of Organizations: Textbook. Moscow: INFRA-M (in Russian).


Skarzhinskayai E.M., Tsurikov V.I. (2014). On the Efficacy of Collective Action. Russian Management Journal 12, 3, 87–106 (in Russian).


Skorobogatov A. (2007). Organizational Economics and Models Incomplete Contracts. Voprosy Ekonomiki 12, 71–95 (in Russian).


Tirole J. (2000). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Vol. 1. Saint Petersburg: Ekonomicheskaya shkola (in Russian).


Tsurikov V.I. (2010a). Model of Incomplete Contract and Redistribution of Rights to the Income Ex Post. Economics and Mathematical Methods 46, 1, 104–116 (in Russian).


Tsurikov V.I. (2010b). Incomplete Contracting, Including Transaction Costs and the Corruption Component. Parth 1. Economic Science of Contemporary Russia 3, 39–51 (in Russian).


Williamson O.E. (1996). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. Saint Petersburg: Lenizdat (in Russian).

Comments

No posts found

Write a review
Translate